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Introduction 
Privacy and Data Protection are usually the spheres around which the ethics of 21st century 
surveillance orbit. With constant appeals to ‘national security’, states and the corporations that 
contribute to data-gathering and processing systems expect populations to be visible and traceable. 
Pre-emptive action might be directed at individuals or groups designated as most dangerous. 
Evidence-gathering to detect and prosecute perpetrators of violence or sedition involves scrutinizing 
such mobile data communications records as have been retained by service providers. Most people, 
with no terrorist intentions whatsoever, participate in systems of mass data-collection in everyday 
life. Online shopping, movie viewing, and accumulating points on loyalty cards are forms of 
surveillance, shaping behaviour to an extent greater than many likely imagine. The advantages we 
accrue are significant, not least when health datasets help epidemiological research or children’s 
educational progress is monitored.  
 
Privacy is a right to be claimed, and respected, and Data Protection regulations enforce legitimate 
use of personal information. However, neither easily draws attention to people’s capacity to manage 
how they are made visible, less visible, or invisible. A Christian social ethic of surveillance can 
usefully turn to practices presented in the biblical traditions; stories of how people, far-removed in 
time for digital environments, might engage us imaginatively in developing appropriate responses to 
visibility/invisibility. 
 
The Bible has many narratives of people making themselves more or less visible before God, of 
God’s own management of Divine in/visibility, and of people’s visibility vis-à-vis one another. In this 
article, I focus on just one story of a person whose visibility is altered by Jesus. I will relate this 
narrative to practices of (in)visibility and suggest that a theology of surveillance from the Cross as a 
valuable paradigm for ethical responses to everyday 21st century surveillance systems. 
 
 
Retelling Zacchaeus’s story (with some imaginative license). 
 
Jericho is 25 km north-east of Jerusalem and news of Jesus’ imminent arrival reaches the 
townspeople gathered excitedly to hear a sequence of runners, each arriving with his 140 characters 
on a clay ostracon. It could get terribly confusing if one runner was a little faster than the others and 
they got the sequence of short messages muddled. However, the people of Jericho work out that 
Jesus is coming. The local Pharisees just have time to erect their small wooden shelters from where 
they can look down the Main Street - thinking they are themselves unobserved - although everyone 




As Jesus turns into the main street one, rather short, man climbs a tree to have a better vantage 
point. He can see Jesus’ slow progress, brought to a crawl by the cluster of street artists feverishly 
sketching rough drawings of Jesus and members of the crowd smiling over his shoulder. Jesus stops 
at a sycamore tree, looks up and starts shouting over the noise to the man sitting in the branches.  
Like an audience at a British pantomime, the crowd boo and hiss the man in the tree; well known to 
them as Zacchaeus, a corrupt tax gatherer, who has been colluding with the Roman authorities. 
 
Jesus invites himself to Zacchaeus’s home for dinner. And, with a bit of jostling and ‘accidental’ 
bumping into Zacchaeus, the crowd parts to let him get home. Zacchaeus' wife - more than a little 
surprised - has barely time to send their daughters to the market for five extra loaves and fishes. To 
cut a long story short, Zacchaeus has a change of heart over dinner with Jesus and offers to 
compensate, by a factor of four, those he has defrauded. And, much to his wife's horror, gives half 
his possessions to the poor.  It is a familiar tale (Lk 19:1-10) and, whatever else it teaches, this a story 
of (in)visibility. 
 
The sociological concept of (in)visibility. 
 
We see people and are seen by others. Our visibility is an important aspect of how societies organize 
relations (Brighenti 2010). Without necessarily involving any duplicity, we present ourselves to 
others differently when we are ‘front stage’ and ‘backstage’ (Goffman 1990 [1959]). We are always 
competitively positioning ourselves relative to others in social space. This positioning is effected 
using relative amounts of capital at our disposal comprised of economic, cultural, social and 
symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1985, 1989). Struggles over fair degrees of visibility may be worked out in 
political action when a group finds itself denied visibility and subject to unwelcome visibility – both 
at the same time. Refugees, for example, might be temporarily housed in large, anonymous housing 
estates where their day-to-day concerns go unobserved by most of the public (and especially out of 
sight of commentators). Yet, in lurid, fear-mongering news media headlines those same refugees are 
forced into hyper-visibility as the supposed source of crime and disorder. Representation of 
categories of people, such as those receiving unemployment benefits, can stigmatize; being visible is 
not simply a matter of fact (one is seen) but of perception (how one is viewed). Surveillance systems 
might gather data concerning refugees, welfare recipients, or multitudinous other categories and 
the analysis be deployed to highlight injustices requiring remedy. The very same processes might 
intrude into everyday lives, inducing fear and restricting legitimate movement. This does not mean 
that surveillance is merely a tool dependent upon the intentions for good or ill of particular agents. 
Rather, flows of personal information are analysed ‘in the context of existing institutional relations 
of power and control’(Hier and Greenberg 2009: 22). The technologies are shaped by and shape 
those relations. 
 
Whilst we can be in a state of more or less visibility, the term ‘(in)visibility’ captures the dynamic 
capacity of making ourselves more and less visible (Stoddart 2011: 140). The ‘in’ of (in)visibility is 
bracketed to reminds us of the fluidity of making ourselves more and less visible, as well as being 
made more and less visible by others. Furthermore, ‘in’ is bracketed to avoid implying a simple 
dichotomy; someone may be visible in a number of areas of life (e.g., attributed or self-claimed 
ethnicity, wealth, or religion) whilst being invisible in others (e.g., as a person with a mental illness). 
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In terms of agency, we can deploy our (in)visibility skilfully or we can neglect to develop this 
capacity. 
 
(In)visibility in the Zacchaeus story. 
Zacchaeus risks increasing his visibility by climbing a tree – although the crowd’s attention is more 
likely to be on the road as they await Jesus’ arrival. Jesus, who is adept at managing his own visibility 
in towns such as Capernaum, Bethany, Jerusalem, and here Jericho, takes Zacchaeus’ control of his 
own visibility out of Zacchaeus' hands. By addressing him directly, Jesus makes Zacchaeus hyper-
visible, and compounds this by inviting himself to dinner at Zacchaeus’ home. Given that Jesus is 
already under scrutiny by religious leaders for his habit of dining with undesirable categories of 
people (Matt. 11:19), he is strategically managing his own visibility; albeit there are consequences 
for his host. The biblical text says nothing about a wife and family of Zacchaeus but it is a reasonable 
assumption that, in this culture, they are around. The actions of Jesus – and the compensation and 
philanthropy of Zacchaeus – combine to significantly increase the visibility of Zacchaeus’ family-unit. 
Whether that was welcome or not is conjecture. The immediate beneficiaries are the poor and the 
defrauded who, although seen every day on street corners or in markets having to buy the most 
meagre of produce, are somewhat socially invisible. The rich simply look through or past them. By 
the end of this dinner, the poor and defrauded have become much more visible to Zacchaeus. 
Similarly, with their new-found funds they will be visible in a new way when they next shop at the 
market. Their visibility has been acknowledged and enhanced by Jesus’ call upon Zacchaeus. 
 
(In)visibility in 21st century contexts. 
Surveillance can be usefully defined as ‘any systematic and routine attention to personal details, 
whether specific or aggregate, for a defined purpose. That purpose, the intention of the surveillance 
practice, may be to protect, understand, care for, ensure entitlement, control, manage or influence 
individuals or groups’ (Lyon 2015: 3). Surveillance ethics is not, however, a matter merely for the 
state, corporations or other data-gathering institutions. When approached by way of (in)visibility the 
ethics of surveillance is an everyday issue and, significantly, a skilled practice. As someone from the 
UK where refugees and asylum-seekers are figures of deep suspicion and treated with great hostility 
by sections of the press, I was impressed by the advertisement for the Norwegian Viking Ship 
museum in Oslo which I visited in May 2017.  A reduced entry fee is publicized for refugees and 
asylum-seekers. Where there is a hostile political climate, increasing the visibility of refugees on a 
museum price-list is a fraught business. (I should, however, give credit to the UK Museums 
Association that has done work in this area of social inclusion.). It is both welcoming and offers 
ammunition for anti-immigrant politicians to stoke grievances.  
Another positive contribution of surveillance technologies to our managing of our visibility lies in the 
area of ‘hidden’ disabilities – such as many learning difficulties. Educational institutions gather 
personal data that can be shared with relevant tutors without raising students’ visibility in the 
classroom. This is, in some ways, in stark contrast to pre-digital days when a classmate would be 
collected quite visibly by the ‘remedial teacher’ and later be liable to playground bullying.  
We could think about how tagging others in our Facebook photos impacts our friends’ (and perhaps 
opponents’) visibility. Being careful with our own privacy settings in the light of photo-tagging is now 
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an important social skill, especially where automated facial recognition systems scan uploaded 
images on social media platforms to offer enhanced user experiences. 
At a simple, and probably rather ineffective level, a teacher might use his mother’s family name 
instead of his own on his Facebook profile as a way of making it more difficult (although not 
impossible) for his pupils to locate him. As a trivial attempt to reduce the effect of online companies’ 
carelessness with my personal data I use a different date of birth each time I register for discount 
coupons. Having six or seven birthdays in the year does mean I receive special offers at odd points in 
the calendar. If there is a legal requirement to identify me – as with the government offices or 
insurance companies I do use my proper birthdate. At a much more serious level, a protestor might 
choose to conceal his face to avoid automated recognition by the police or security services in 
regimes that are actually, or potentially, hostile to legal and peaceful demonstrations.  
(In)visibility is politically-charged, particularly in challenges to the integrity of encrypted messaging 
systems that increase in intensity following a terrorist crime. We in the UK observed this after the 
recent Westminster Bridge and Palace killings. Our Home Secretary called again for a back-door to 
systems such as WhatsApp – with either gross ignorance or wilful misinformation as to the 
technological practicalities (Haynes 2017). Lawyer-client privilege and whistle-blowing by insider 
informants on institutional corruption or malpractice, not to mention to regular, professional 
journalists’ connections to sources, are legitimate reasons for retaining technological options to 
manage our own (in)visibility (CCBE 2016). 
Rights language in terms of privacy, as important as it is, only captures some of the dimensions 
highlighted by the concept of (in)visibility. Whilst privacy is a moral claim against others (usually 
institutions) it is a discourse that does not readily point to our responsibility to manage our own 
privacy (or visibility). In surveillance cultures it might not be a breach of privacy when someone is 
housed in a block known to be reserved for refugees, or to be seen by members of the public when 
one is visiting a Welfare Benefits office. But these are questions of visibility. So too are the material 
effects upon people resulting from a category into which they have been placed through the 
algorithmic sorting of surveillance data – what David Lyon calls, ‘the invisible doors that permit 
access to or exclude from participation in a multitude of events, experiences, and processes’ (Lyon 
2003: 13). Privacy might work for individuals but not for groups – especially when the group is one of 
which we are not aware we have been placed. This might be credit-scoring, crime-rates for the area 
in which we live, or arguably more trivial, the consumer profiles created about us that determine the 
special offers we receive. How, by whom, for what purposes, and with what credibility are we being 
sorted or categorised by our personal information? What characteristics are attributed to the 
category into which we have been placed – identities by which are made more visible – perhaps 
hyper-visible – to corporations or governments?  The reverse of this also holds – are there important 
aspects of our identity that are rendered invisible (or at least less visible) because they are not 
quantifiable? Although there are attitudinal scales that social scientists use to measure levels of 
perceived social trust or, for example, some dimensions of religiosity, I think we might want to resist 
surveillance as social sorting that categorises virtue. Measuring or at least estimating our value as 
‘good’ customers is one thing – but already ‘good’ is being morphed or shaped in the image of the 
market. 
The shape of a Christian ethics of (in)visibility 
Surveillance from the Cross 
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For some years now I have advocated that we can usefully frame a Christian response to surveillance 
by talking about ‘surveillance from the Cross’ (Stoddart 2011).  Whilst I think it is meaningful to talk 
about Jesus himself being under surveillance during his public ministry (from the Pharisees, teachers 
of the law, and the Romans (e.g., Luke 14:1)), we can talk metaphorically in a way that opens deeper 
insights. To speak of ‘surveillance from the Cross’ or ‘cruciform surveillance’ is to talk of a quality of 
surveillance that coheres to the character qualities of Christ. It is perhaps easiest if I offer first the 
contrast, then return to the Cross. The contrast I have in mind is those traditional images of Christ as 
pantokrator (‘Lord Almighty’, as in 2 Cor. 6:18 and in Revelation). The emphasis in this iconography is 
on his all-watching, all-powerful, history-dispensing, lordship of the cosmos and history. I think this is 
problematic because its affinity with images of an imperial rule too easily becomes a political 
theology justifying powerful earthly rule in the name of a powerful divine authority. At the risk of 
over-simplifying, we might characterise this as ‘surveillance from the throne’. It typifies traditional 
appeals to God’s watching over us that aim to threaten, instil obedience to religious (and political) 
rulers, and is rather closely aligned not only with empire but with patriarchy too. 
If, by contrast, we take the Cross, rather than a throne, as the paradigm for the quality of God’s 
watching care, quite different dimensions come to the surface. If the character of Jesus is embodied 
most fully on the Cross, the controlling paradigm is therefore humility, service, self-sacrifice, and 
solidarity with the poor and otherwise marginalised. The man who preached the sermon at Nazareth 
(Luke 4:16-19) – lifting up the broken hearted and giving sight to the blind – lives, and as a victim of 
political torture, dies this message. To refer then to ‘surveillance from the Cross’ is to frame a better 
quality of watching – one of solidarity with the weak, one of self-restraint, humility, and fellow-
suffering. (In effect, this is to interpret the power imagery of pantokrator in terms of the suffering 
servant.) 
When, rather than a throne, we make the Cross, our primary paradigm for the quality of better 
watching-over (surveillance in other words) we find a very different political theology of surveillance 
confronting us. So, when we bring this back to the narrower field of (in)visibility we can talk about 
Jesus, our fellow-sufferer, the one in solidarity with the poor and marginalised who intervenes in the 
(in)visibility of other people. The tale from Jericho presents a Jesus who takes control of another 
person’s (in)visibility; namely that of Zacchaeus. This is for Zacchaeus’s sake – but also for the sake of 
those whom Zacchaeus has defrauded.  
If we then turn to Zacchaeus, he is, I think, a useful paradigm for Christians who want to lay claim to 
the control of their (in)visibility. Zacchaeus’s (in)visibility is no longer at his discretion to deploy on 
his terms. His (in)visibility is, to some extent, although not fully, taken out of his hands. His 
(in)visibility is relativized by Jesus’ prior claim upon him. To put this another way, Christians may not 
always give priority to their own (in)visibility. The impact upon others’ visibility ought always be 
considered in the light of Christ’s prior call.   
Surprisingly, there is a link to 21st century surveillance concerns buried in the Greek text of this 
narrative.  It is not any tree, but a sycamore-fig tree (sukomoréa) that Zachaeus climbs (Lk. 19:5). 
This is significant in the story because Zacchaeus’s confession and promise of compensation also 
mentions figs. These are hidden away in the Greek for ‘I accused falsely’ or ‘I defrauded’ (Lk. 19:8). 
Zacchaeus owns up to sukophantéo – literally to being a ‘fig-informer’ or one using inside 
information to defraud (Strong 2010: 237) (Fitzmeyer 1981-1985: 1225). The fig-informer climbed a 
fig-tree. It is reasonable then to link Zacchaeus with 21st century fraudsters such as insider traders in 
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shares on the stock market or who, through the misuse of people’s personal information takes 
advantage of them. He is someone who uses surveillance data to manipulate costs to certain groups 
of people – perhaps in ways that they do not even know is happening.  
I do not want to hang an entire Christian social ethics of surveillance from one branch of a sycamore-
fig tree. Nevertheless, salvation comes to Zacchaeus in the form of repentance from illicit use of 
personal information, and a commitment to recompense those he has defrauded. The kingdom of 
God comes in the unmasking of illicit surveillance practices and in recompense to those poor (or 
otherwise) people who have been the defrauders’ victims.  
Surveillance from the Cross – or (in)visibility ethics in the light of the Cross – place, I think, a strong 
emphasis not only on responsibility but solidarity. As the encyclical Sollicitudo rei socialis so aptly 
affirms, this takes us beyond the mere fact of interdependence in an increasingly globalised world, 
to genuine relationships characterised by ‘a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself 
to the common good; that is to say to the good of all and of each individual, because we are all really 
responsible for all’ (John Paul II 1987: §38). This requires recognising one another as neighbours and 
helpers, not instrumentally in the sense of others being valuable only in as much as they are useful 
to our own flourishing. If the goods of this world are, theologically speaking, meant for all then a 
Christian social ethic interrogates those structures of sin that need to be overcome in order that 
those denied goods are provided with what they need for their authentic human development (John 
Paul II 1987: §§36, 42). In the immediate context of surveillance cultures this means holding a 
preferential option for the digitally poor. Poverty here means not merely any lack of digital 
technologies but those whose life chances are hindered by disproportionate surveillance. But, it may 
be, as we have seen, that particular data-gathering might draw attention to hidden injustices or 
identify interventions that are required (as in epidemiological studies).   
Concrete (or visible) implications. 
There are many implications of this ethics of (in)visibility. In the political dimension, will we support 
political parties that deploy surveillance regimes that adversely impact the visibility of already-
marginalised groups, or introduce new forms of marginalisation? This is not limited to questions of 
national security but, as welfare benefit systems comes under increasing pressure from neoliberal 
economic models, we may wish to consider withdrawing support from politicians who use the most 
needy in our country as targets for intrusive surveillance.  
In the social dimension, how complicit are we each prepared to be in the manipulation of others 
visibility through our actions on social media? Knowing that all the time our personal information is 
being monetized by internet platforms, what practical skills are we developing that will make us 
more careful with the implications of our own (in)visibility upon the (in)visibility of others? 
Workplace surveillance – controlling the (in)visibility of employees – has people in decision-making 
positions who, by sharpening up their ethical focus, could make significant challenges to a 
surveillance culture. So, in the professional dimension, what is the level of our awareness of the 
impact of our professional decisions upon the (in)visibility of our employees or colleagues? Do we 
surrender to the popular attitude that resorts to more surveillance as the answer to any problem in 
the workplace? Some healthcare workers have protested at passport checks becoming part of their 
responsibilities in admitting patients (as a government initiative to address perceived levels of 
‘health tourism’ (Potter 2017). In what is taken to be a misunderstanding of government guidance, 
teachers in some local authorities have been expected to request passport evidence of non-white 
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children in order to identify refugees and asylum-seekers, much to the objections of a number of 
parents (Pells 2016).  
The paradigm of surveillance from the Cross propels us to ask who, amongst the poor and 
marginalised, are most affected – and in what ways? This is a crucial ethical test for any surveillance 
system or culture. The British sociologist Zygmunt Bauman makes this telling observation when 
discussing attempts to promote security with calls for people to sacrifice freedom: 
Security sacrificed in the name of freedom tends to be other people’s security; and freedom 
sacrificed in the name of security tends to be other people’s freedom (Bauman 2001: 20). 
In a world where the successful secede from community participation and responsibilities – behind 
gated communities and privatised systems of health, education, and even security, provision – 
Bauman’s is a significant challenge (Bauman 2001: 50). A Christian ethics of surveillance counters 
just such withdrawal and, instead, calls for solidarity – not too unlike that which Zacchaeus modelled 
by the end of his impromptu dinner hosting Jesus. Zacchaeus, separated from us by 2000 years, is, I 
suggest, at least worth a second look as the patron saint of surveillance, bearing in mind that his 
practice of (in)visibility cost him more than half his possessions. 
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